This paper reviews the role of competition in banking against the background of a transforming sector. It uses industrial organization and modern financial intermediation analysis to study the relationships between the level of competition, risk taking incentives, and the regulatory frame. The consequences for market structure of the liberalization process and the need for competition policy in the sector are highlighted.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition has always been contentious in banking. It does not take a lot of thinking to conclude that the situation before the liberalization was far from the optimal balance between enjoying the benefits of competition and increasing the potential for instability.
Indeed, the costs of financial repression and regulatory failure are apparent by now. However:
• Has the pendulum moved too far towards unleashing competitive forces in banking?
Or, to the contrary:
• The consolidation wave poses a threat to competition in the sector?
Or still perhaps:
• We need not worry about public intervention and competition policy because the Internet and globalization have made banking contestable?
To answer those questions is certainly not easy. In this paper I will try to shed some light on these issues taking stock of modern industrial organization and financial intermediation analysis. A challenge that the analysis must face is to take account of the specificity of banking in relation to other industries.
Section II starts by reviewing trends in banking and in its regulation. Section III surveys contributions from industrial organization and financial intermediation theory to understand the effects of banking competition.
Section IV looks at the relationships between liberalization, market enlargement, and diversification and tries to understand the underpinnings behind the consolidation wave. It starts with the puzzle of why banks keep merging while economic studies do not give much value to such mergers. Section V looks at the role of size in the banking firm and the effects on market structure: Is banking a natural oligopoly? Section VI examines the role of competition policy in a transforming banking sector and concluding remarks follow.
II. TRENDS IN BANKING AND IN ITS REGULATION
In the recent h istory of banking we can distinguish between two periods. One of strong regulation, intervention, and stability, lasting from the 1940s up to the 1970s, and, subsequently, one marked by liberalization and greater instability.
In the earlier of these periods, the regulation of rates, Behind this process of liberalization and regulatory reform we find advances in information technology, in the processing of transactions (automatic tellers, telephone and electronic banking), and in computational capacity.
There have also been advances in management techniques and risk coverage (based on the use of derived lack of internal risk control methods, together with mistakes in fiscal and monetary policy in the context of an asset price bubble.
In Spain financial liberalization started in the 1970s and the banking crisis of the first half of the 1980s is explained by the large impact of the economic crisis derived from the oil shocks, the close links of banks with industrial firm, lack of diversification of banks' i ndustrial portfolios, bad management and inadequate supervision (see Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990) (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) The internal model approach can be rationalized as a direct revelation mechanism where a bank of a certain type sends a message to the regulator about its type and is required then to hold a certain level of capital (see Rochet (1999) ).
market power (Vives (1991) See, for example, Hart (1983) , Schaferstein (1988 ), Hermalin (1990 , Schmidt (1997) , Allen and Gale (2000) , and Vives (2000) . danger of systemic risk owing to contagion from the failure of an e ntity, which may give rise to a strong negative externality both for the financial sector and for the real sector of the economy. 12 Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort have been put in place precisely to face the potential fragility of the banking system. Those facilities may compound the moral hazard problem.
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In summary, banking is fragile with an important probability of failure, a potentially severe moral hazard problem, and failure has associated a large social cost, typically of a systemic nature. The fact that governments are prepared to pay large amounts to bail out banks as opposed to simply liquidating them may be interpreted as evidence that the external cost of failure is perceived to be high.
14 How do the specificities of banking affect the desirability of competition in the sector?
A first remark is that competition is not responsible for the fragile character of banking. A monopoly bank can be subject to a run. Fragility comes from a coordination problem faced by depositors that g enerates multiple equilibria some of which imply the collapse of entities or even the whole system (Matutes and Vives (1996) ).
However, competition can be excessive in banking.
Indeed, market power, up to some degree, may be beneficial in banking. In other words, the view that competition is unambiguously good in banking is more naive than in other industries. Market power moderates risk taking incentives. In static models of deposit competition a bank with some market power is less aggressive setting rates. This may be valuable in particular when the social cost of failure is high and deposit rates excessive. Flat premium deposit insurance tends to make the banks more aggressive by increasing the elasticity of the residual supply of deposits faced by the bank Vives (1996 and 2000) ). Risk-based deposit insurance moderates risk taking incentives but still banks may take too much risk in the presence of a large social cost of failure (Matutes and Vives (2000) ).
Limited liability will imply that banks will take excessive risk on the asset side except if the risk position of the bank can be assessed (for example, by large holders of CDs). A bank then cannot increase its market share and profits by taking more risk because investors discount it. Disclosure requirements may help making the risk position of the bank known (or more realistically, better assessed). However, introducing flat premium deposit insurance (or implicit bailouts) destroys the disciplining effect of the market because then investors do not care about the failure of the bank.
In a dynamic setting market power enhances the charter value of a bank and makes the bank more conservative.
Indeed, a bank with more market power enjoys higher profits and has more to lose if it takes more risk, fails and its charter is revoked. If future profits weight enough the bank will moderate its risk taking. Indeed, the decline of charter values due to deregulation and liberalization has been blamed for the increase in failures in the banking sector from the 1980s on (Keeley (1990) , Hellmann et al (2000) ).
All these explanations have in common that market power raises the opportunity cost of going bankrupt.
Competition on the credit side has equally ambiguous implications on welfare. To start with the bank faces both adverse selection and moral hazard problems when lending to firms. The well-known effect is that a higher rate set by the bank will tend to draw riskier applicants (adverse selection) and/or induce the borrower firms to choose riskier projects (moral hazard). 15 Banks may find optimal then to ration credit instead of raising the interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ). A bank with market power has more incentive to alleviate this asymmetric information problem by investing in monitoring the projects of firms and establishing value enhancing relationship banking (Besanko and Thakor (1993) , Rajan (1994, 1995) tendency towards credit rationing to avoid the increase of the average riskness of the pool of applicants. Even abstracting from the possibility of banking failure market power presents a welfare trade-off. This is easily understood. More market power for the bank diminishes the moral hazard problem faced by the bank but aggravates it for the entrepreneur. Some market power tends to be good unless monitoring is very costly (Caminal and Matutes (1997a) ).
If to this we add the possibility of banking failure the analysis becomes more complicated. In principle a first effect of higher lending rates is to depress investment and, under plausible assumptions, to decrease the overall portfolio risk of the bank. More rivalry then should increase the probability of failure of the bank and have adverse welfare consequences. However, more competition may destroy incentives to monitor and therefore reduce lending. If the latter effect is strong enough a monopolistic bank may be more exposed to aggregate uncertainty (because it tends to ration credit less) and be more likely to fail (Caminal and Matutes (1997b) ).
All in all it seems plausible to expect that, other things equal, an increase in competition will tend to increase risk taking incentives and the probability of failure of banks. This tendency may be moderated by reputational concerns (Boot and Greenbaum (1993) 
IV. LIBERALIZATION, DIVERSIFICATION, AND CONSOLIDATION
There is a puzzle linked to empirical banking studies of economies of scale. Indeed, most academic econometric studies in banking find that economies of scale are exhausted at relatively low asset levels and that the supposed cost efficiencies of mergers are hard to find or inconclusive (see Rhoades (1998) , Calomiris and Karceski (1998) and Piloff and Santomero(1996) for overviews).
Furthermore, the market assessment of mergers is either inconclusive or it is found that the acquirer suffers a loss of market value. However, banks continue to merge.
Although large horizontal mergers in the US are found to cut total costs -basically staff costs and data processing systems and operations-this does not mean that cost efficiency is improved in terms of the appropriate ratios or econometric estimates. A problem arises in that empirical studies of scale economies and cost efficiency typically do not account for risk.
Indeed, the studies measure the effect on cost of the joint increase in scale and risk. Noting that the lower cost of risk management of a larger better diversified bank may induce the bank to take on more risk, cost savings may not be detected then if to take on more risk is costly. Controlling for risk taking, large economies of scale that increase with asset size are found in US banks (Hughes et al (1996 (Hughes et al ( , 1998 ).
If to control for risk helps resolving the puzzle then a key component of a consolidation is the augmented 
Diversification and Consolidation
Diversification can be achieved with mergers between financial institutions. Recent empirical studies in the US find strong benefits of consolidation (improving profitability and production efficiency, and reducing insolvency risk) when the degree of macroeconomic (geographic) diversification increases (Hughes et al (1996 (Hughes et al ( , 1998 If the results of these studies generalize then it seems possible to have an increase in competition coupled with a reduction of insolvency risk, via consolidation, as an outcome of the liberalization process.
V. SIZE ADVANTAGES AND MARKET CONCENTRATION: A NATURAL BANKING OLIGOPOLY?
Size This is what happened with a segment of the US S&L industry. At the same time the optimal degree of competition in banking will depend on the level of the social of cost of failure and the capacity to use risk based insurance and disclosure requirements to limit risk taking. In countries where the cost of failure is high and the power of "market-like" instruments low, as in emergent/LDC economies, the optimal level of competition will be lower.
Still the question arises of whether the globalization process and Internet make banking contestable and whether, again, competition may be excessive. Indeed, we may think that Internet, as an extremely efficient search facility (for example with search engines facilitating price comparisons) may increase so much the elasticity of demand that firms/banks may not be able to recover fixed costs (Ellison and Ellison (2001) Petersen and Rajan (2001) show that the distance between firms and their lenders is increasing in the US. They conjecture that this is due not to banking consolidation but to a higher availability of borrowers' credit records and to an increased efficiency in processing them. Wholesale and investment banking is a global segment with strong competition where perhaps only a few players can survive. This means that the relevant market in retail (families and SME) is local, despite the possible extension due to electronic banking, and in wholesale and investment banking global.
How can the level of competition be influenced without causing distortions?
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In a Hotelling model Schultz (2001) finds that increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more difficult to sustain (the elasticity effect dominates) meanwhile increasing transparency on the consumer and producer sides (assumed at the same level) at the same time also makes collusion more difficult.
Merger policy can be used to soften competition by being more lenient in allowing consolidation. In the US the de facto antitrust exemption for banking ends with Supreme
Court decisions in 1944, 1963 and 1964 and for mergers somewhat more lax criteria than in general are applied.
The safe heaven thresholds for the Herfindahl index in the relevant market below which a merger will not be challenged are higher for banking than for other industries. Otherwise, there is a potential challenge by the regulator (OCC, FDIC or FED) and the DOJ, the latter using typically more stringent criteria, subject to the usual analysis of entry conditions and efficiency defense.
In the US typically mergers have been approved subject to some branch divestiture not to increase concentration in the local market. In the extreme competition should be restricted for institutions heading for trouble. The competitive tools will certainly be misused to extend risk taking in this case.
